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Abstract—This paper considers a multiuser multiple-input
single-output (MISO) downlink system with simultaneous wire-
less information and power transfer. In particular, we focus on
secure communication in the presence of passive eavesdroppers
and potential eavesdroppers (idle legitimate receivers). We study
the design of a resource allocation algorithm minimizing the total
transmit power for the case when the legitimate receivers are
able to harvest energy from radio frequency signals. Our design
advocates the dual use of both artificial noise and energy signals
in providing secure communication and facilitating efficient
wireless energy transfer. The algorithm design is formulated as
a non-convex optimization problem. The problem formulation
takes into account artificial noise and energy signal generation for
protecting the transmitted information against both considered
types of eavesdroppers when imperfect channel state information
(CSI) of the potential eavesdroppers and no CSI of the passive
eavesdroppers are available at the transmitter. Besides, the
problem formulation also takes into account different quality
of service (QoS) requirements: a minimum required signal-to-
interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) at the desired receiver; maxi-
mum tolerable SINRs at the potential eavesdroppers; a minimum
required outage probability at the passive eavesdroppers; and
minimum required heterogeneous amounts of power transferred
to the idle legitimate receivers. In light of the intractability of the
problem, we reformulate the considered problem by replacing a
non-convex probabilistic constraint with a convex deterministic
constraint. Then, a semi-definite programming (SDP) relaxation
approach is adopted to obtain the optimal solution for the
reformulated problem. Furthermore, we propose a suboptimal
resource allocation scheme with low computational complexity
for providing communication secrecy and facilitating efficient
energy transfer. Simulation results demonstrate the close-to-
optimal performance of the proposed schemes and significant
transmit power savings by optimization of the artificial noise
and energy signal generation.
Index Terms—Physical (PHY) layer security, passive eaves-
dropper, wireless information and power transfer, artificial noise,
robust beamforming.
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THE exponential growth in the demand for high datarates in wireless communication networks has led to a
tremendous need for energy. The rapidly escalated energy
consumption not only increases the operating cost of com-
munication systems, but also raises serious environmental
concerns. As a result, green radio communications has re-
ceived much attention in both academia and industry [1]–[9].
In particular, multiple antennas and multicarrier technologies
have been proposed in the literature for facilitating energy
savings in wireless communication systems. Unfortunately,
the computational burden and power consumption incurred by
the signal processing required for these technologies may be
too high for small portable mobile units. As an alternative,
multiuser multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) has been
proposed where a transmitter equipped with multiple anten-
nas services multiple single-antenna users. However, mobile
communication devices are often powered by capacity limited
batteries. Hence, the lifetime of mobile devices remains the
bottleneck in the development of ubiquitous wireless commu-
nication services.
The integration of energy harvesting with communication
devices is considered a promising alternative in providing
self-sustainability to energy limited communication systems
[1]–[8]. Hydroelectric, piezoelectric, solar, and wind are the
major conventional energy sources for energy harvesting.
Nevertheless, the availability of these natural energy sources
is usually limited by location or climate and may be prob-
lematic in indoor environments. On the other hand, ambient
background electromagnetic radiation in radio frequency (RF)
is also a viable source of energy for energy scavenging. More
importantly, wireless energy harvesting technology facilitates
the possibility of simultaneous wireless information and power
transfer. Yet, this new technology introduces a paradigm shift
in system and resource allocation algorithm design due to
the imposed new challenges. In [3], the fundamental tradeoff
between harvested energy and data rate was studied. In [4],
a power allocation algorithm was proposed for near-field
communication systems. However, the results from [3] and [4]
were obtained by assuming that the receiver is able to recycle
energy and decode information from the same received signal
which is not possible yet in practice. Thus, power splitting
hybrid receivers and separated receivers were proposed in [5]
and [6], respectively, as a compromise solution. In particular,
the power splitting receiver splits the received power into
two power streams in order to facilitate simultaneous energy
2harvesting and information decoding at the receiver. In [7],
the authors proposed different power allocation algorithms
and showed that introducing power splitting receivers can
improve the energy efficiency of a communication system.
Transmitting an energy signal along with the information
signal was proposed in [8] for expediting energy harvesting
at the receivers. In practice, the transmitter can increase the
energy of the information carrying signal to facilitate energy
harvesting at the receivers. However, this may also increase
the susceptibility to eavesdropping due to a higher potential
for information leakage. Therefore, a new quality of service
(QoS) concern on communication security arises in systems
with simultaneous information and power transfer.
In fact, security is a fundamental problem in wireless
communication systems due to the broadcast nature of the
wireless medium. Traditionally, communication security relies
on cryptographic encryption employed at the application layer.
However, the commonly used encryption algorithms are based
on the assumption of limited computational capability at the
eavesdroppers [10], [11]. Besides, these algorithms assume a
perfect secret key management and distribution which may
not be possible in wireless networks. Hence, recently a large
amount of work has been devoted to information-theoretic
physical (PHY) layer security [12]–[16], as an alternative
or complement to cryptographic encryption. The principle of
PHY layer security is to exploit the physical characteristics of
the wireless fading channel for providing perfect secrecy of
communication. In his pioneering work on PHY layer security
[12], Wyner showed that in a wire-tap channel, a source and
a destination can exchange perfectly secure information at
a strictly positive data rate whenever the source-destination
channel enjoys better conditions compared to the source-
eavesdropper channel. Hence, exploiting multiple antennas
has been proposed in the literature to ensure secure com-
munication. In particular, by utilizing the extra degrees of
freedom offered by multiple antennas, artificial noise (/inter-
ference) is injected into the communication channel to impair
the received signals at the eavesdroppers. In [13] and [14],
power allocation algorithms were proposed for maximizing
the ergodic secrecy capacity and outage secrecy capacity via
artificial noise generation, respectively. In [15], joint opti-
mization of transmit beamforming and artificial noise was
performed to ensure secure communication in a system with
multiple single antenna eavesdroppers. In [16], outage-based
optimization was proposed to maximize the system secrecy
capacity. However, the energy sources of the receivers in [13]–
[16] were assumed to be perpetual which may not be possible
for energy constrained systems. Furthermore, artificial noise
generation may consume a significant portion of the transmit
power to guarantee secure communication [13]–[16]. On the
other hand, the transmitted artificial noise can be harvested by
the receivers and the recycled energy can be used to extend
the lifetime of power-constrained portable devices. Yet, the
proposed algorithms in [13]–[16] do not exploit the dual use
of artificial noise for securing the communication and energy
harvesting.
The notion of secure communication in energy harvesting
systems has recently been pursued in different contexts. In
[1], different power allocation algorithms with artificial noise
generation were designed for power splitting receivers to
realize efficient concurrent power transfer and secure commu-
nication. In [2], a multi-objective approach was used to jointly
maximize the energy harvesting efficiency and minimize the
total transmit power while ensuring communication secrecy.
Exploiting an energy signal to provide secure communication
in systems with separated information and energy harvesting
receivers was studied in [17], [18]. Yet, the assumption of
having perfect channel state information (CSI) of the energy
harvesting receivers in [1], [2], [17], and [18] may be overly
optimistic. In fact, the energy harvesting receivers are not con-
tinuously interacting with the transmitter and the correspond-
ing CSI at the transmitter may be outdated even if the channel
is only slowly time varying. Besides, the energy receivers can
be malicious and take advantage of the system by reporting
false CSI (in frequency division duplex (FDD) systems). In
[19], robust beamforming for the case of imperfect CSI was
studied for energy harvesting communication systems with
one energy harvesting receiver and one information receiver
without considering communication security. However, it is
unclear if the solution in [19] can be extended to multiple
energy harvesting receivers while ensuring secure commu-
nication. Furthermore, different types of eavesdroppers may
exist in the system. For instance, passive eavesdroppers are
illegitimate users who are not registered. They are usually
silent to hide their existence from the transmitter. On the
other hand, although legitimate users are registered in the
system, they may misbehave and eavesdrop the information
signal of other legitimate receivers when they are idle. Thus,
idle legitimate receivers are potential eavesdroppers. Yet, the
frameworks proposed in [1], [3], [13]–[19] do not take into
account the coexistence of passive eavesdroppers and potential
eavesdroppers. In addition, these works do not fully utilize
both artificial noise and energy signals for providing secure
communication and improving wireless energy transfer in the
system. Thus, the algorithms proposed in [1], [3], [13]–[19]
may not be able to support the emerging QoS requirements
on secure communication in systems with energy harvesting
receivers, especially when passive eavesdroppers and potential
eavesdroppers coexist in the environment.
In this paper, we address the above issues. To this end, the
resource allocation algorithm design for secure communication
in multiuser multiple-input single-output (MISO) systems with
concurrent wireless information and power transfer is formu-
lated as a non-convex optimization problem. The problem
formulation encourages the dual use of both artificial noise
and energy signals for facilitating efficient energy transfer and
ensuring communication security. In particular, both artificial
noise and energy signals are used to degrade the intercep-
tion capabilities of the eavesdroppers when imperfect CSI
of the potential eavesdroppers and no CSI of the passive
eavesdroppers are available at the transmitter. For obtaining a
tractable solution, we reformulate the considered problem by
replacing a non-convex probabilistic constraint with a tractable
convex deterministic constraint. The resulting reformulated
non-convex optimization problem is solved by a semi-definite
programming (SDP) based resource allocation algorithm. Fur-
3thermore, we propose a suboptimal resource allocation scheme
which provides an excellent system performance at low com-
putational complexity.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, after introducing the notation used in this
paper, we present the adopted multiuser downlink channel
model for secure communication with simultaneous wireless
information and power transfer.
A. Notation
For a square-matrix X, Tr(X) denotes the trace of the
matrix and X  0 indicates that X is a positive semi-definite
matrix. (X)H and Rank(X) denote the conjugate transpose
and the rank of matrix X, respectively.
[
X
]
a,b
extracts the
(a, b)-th element of matrix X. Matrix IN denotes an N ×N
identity matrix. CN×M and RN×M denote the spaces of
N ×M matrices with complex and real entries, respectively.
‖·‖ and |·| denote the Euclidean norm of a matrix/vector and
the absolute value of a complex scalar, respectively. Re(·)
extracts the real part of a complex-valued input. HN represents
the set of all N -by-N complex Hermitian matrices. λmax
(
X
)
and λj
(
X
)
denote the maximum eigenvalue and the j-th
eigenvalue of Hermitian matrix X, respectively. The distri-
bution of a circularly symmetric complex Gaussian (CSCG)
vector with mean vector x and covariance matrix Σ is denoted
by CN (x,Σ), and ∼ means “distributed as”. For a real valued
continuous function f(·), ∇Xf(X) represents the gradient
of f(·) with respect to matrix X. E{·} represents statistical
expectation.
B. Downlink Channel Model
We consider the downlink of a communication system
which consists of a transmitter, K legitimate receivers, and
J passive eavesdroppers. The transmitter is equipped with
NT transmit antennas while the legitimate receivers are single
antenna devices and are able to decode information and harvest
energy from radio signals, cf. Figure 1. Besides, the J passive
eavesdroppers are also equipped with a single antenna, respec-
tively, and their goal is to decode the information transmitted
by the transmitter without causing any interference to the
communication channel. There are two types of legitimate
receivers in the system; one desired receiver and K − 1 idle
receivers. In each scheduling slot, the transmitter conveys
information to the desired receiver and transfers energy1 to all
legitimate receivers simultaneously. The K − 1 idle receivers
are supposed to harvest energy from the RF when they are
inactive. However, the signals intended for the desired receiver
may be overheard by the idle receivers since all the legitimate
receivers are in the range of service coverage. If the idle
receivers are malicious, they may eavesdrop the information
signal of the desired receiver. Hence, the idle receivers are
potential eavesdroppers which should be taken into account
1In this paper, a normalized energy unit, i.e., Joule-per-second, is adopted.
Therefore, the terms power and energy are used interchangeably throughout
this paper.
for providing secure communication. We focus on frequency
flat communication channels. The downlink received signals
at the desired receiver, idle receiver (potential eavesdropper)
k, and passive eavesdropper2 j are given by, respectively,
y = hHx+ za, (1)
yIdle,k = g
H
k x+ za,k, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K − 1}, (2)
yE,j = l
H
j x+ ze,j, ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , J}, (3)
where x ∈ CNT×1 denotes the transmitted symbol vector.
hH ∈ C1×NT is the channel vector between the transmitter
and the desired receiver and gHk ∈ C1×NT is the channel
vector between the transmitter and idle receiver (potential
eavesdropper) k ∈ {1, . . . ,K − 1}. lHj ∈ C1×NT is the chan-
nel vector between the transmitter and passive eavesdropper
j ∈ {1, . . . , J}. We note that variables, h, gk, and lj include
the effects of the multipath fading, shadowing, and path loss
of the associated channels. za, za,k, and ze,j are thermal noises
resulting from the receive antennas at the desired receiver, idle
receiver k, and passive eavesdropper j, respectively. They are
modeled as additive white Gaussian noises (AWGN) with zero
mean and variance σ2ant, respectively, cf. Figure 1.
C. Hybrid Information and Energy Harvesting Receiver
Different hardware circuitries [5], [20] are available for
harvesting energy from the RF. The associated system models
and the corresponding energy harvesting efficiencies can be
significantly different3. Besides, the signal used for decoding
the modulated information cannot be reused for harvesting
energy due to hardware limitations [5]. Therefore, we do not
assume a particular type of energy harvesting circuit such that
the resource allocation algorithm design is isolated from the
specific hardware implementation details. In this paper, we
adopt hybrid receivers [5], [7] which split the received signal
into two power streams with power splitting ratios 1−ρ and ρ,
cf. Figure 1, for harvesting energy and decoding the modulated
information, respectively. Specifically, the power splitting unit
is installed in the front-end of the receiver and is assumed
to be a perfect passive analog device; it does not introduce
any extra power gain, i.e., 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1, or noise. Indeed, the
hybrid receiver is a generalization of traditional information
receivers and energy harvesting receivers. In particular, by
imposing power splitting ratios of ρ = 1 and ρ = 0, the
hybrid receiver reduces to a traditional information receiver
and an energy harvesting receiver, respectively. Moreover, the
separated receiver proposed in the literature [2], [19] is also a
special case of the considered hybrid receivers. Furthermore,
we assume that a rechargeable battery is available at the
receivers for storage of the harvested energy. The stored
energy is preserved for future use to extend the lifetime of
the receivers. We note that if the amount of harvested energy
exceeds the maximum battery capacity, the excess harvested
2In practice, the number of passive eavesdroppers is not known at the
transmitter. Nevertheless, by assuming a particular value for J , we can ensure
that the transmitter is able to handle at most J passive eavesdroppers.
3Designing hardware circuitries for harvesting energy from the RF is
beyond the scope of this paper. Interested readers may refer to [5], [20] for
further details.
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Fig. 1. Multiuser system model for K = 3 legitimate mobile receivers and J = 2 passive eavesdroppers. The upper half of the figure illustrates the block
diagram of the transceiver model for wireless information and power transfer.
energy will be discarded. On the other hand, we assume that
the desired information receiver has stored enough energy to
decode the received signal.
D. Channel State Information
We assume a Time Division Duplex (TDD) system with
slowly time-varying channels. At the beginning of each
scheduling slot, the legitimate receivers send handshak-
ing/beacon signals4 to the transmitter to report their status
(service requirements). The information embedded in the
handshaking signals facilitates the downlink packet transmis-
sion. In particular, the downlink CSI of the transmitter-to-
legitimate receiver channels is obtained through measuring the
uplink pilots in the handshaking/beacon signals via channel
reciprocity. Thus, the transmitter-to-legitimate receiver fading
gains, h and gk, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K − 1}, can be reliably
estimated at the transmitter at the beginning of each scheduling
slot with negligible estimation errors. During the transmission,
the desired receiver sends acknowledgement (ACK) packets to
inform the transmitter of successful reception of information
packets. As a result, the transmitter is able to refine the
estimate of h frequently via the pilot sequences embedded
in each ACK packet. Therefore, we can assume perfect CSI
for the transmitter-to-desired receiver link during the whole
transmission period. However, the CSI of the idle receivers
becomes outdated during the transmission since there is no
interaction between the transmitter and the idle receivers. To
capture this effect, we use a deterministic model [21], [22] for
modelling the resulting CSI uncertainty. The CSI of the link
4The legitimate receivers can either take turns to send the handshak-
ing/beacon signals or transmit simultaneously with orthogonal pilot sequences.
between the transmitter and idle receiver k is given by
gk = gˆk +∆gk, k ∈ {1, . . . ,K − 1}, and (4)
Ωk ,
{
∆gk ∈ C
NT×1 : ∆gHk ∆gk ≤ ε
2
k
}
, (5)
where gˆk ∈ CNT×1 is the channel estimate of idle receiver k
available at the transmitter at the beginning of a scheduling
slot. ∆gk represents the unknown channel uncertainty of idle
receiver k due to the slow timing varying nature of the channel
during transmission. For notational simplicity, we define a set
Ωk in (5) which contains all possible CSI uncertainties of
idle receiver k. Specifically, the radius εk > 0 represents
the size of the uncertainty region of the estimated CSI of
idle receiver k. In practice, the value of ε2k depends on the
coherence time of the associated channel and the time between
channel estimation and packet transmission.
On the other hand, the passive eavesdroppers, which are also
present in the system, are usually silent to hide their existence
from the transmitter. As a result, the CSI of the passive
eavesdroppers cannot be measured at the transmitter based
on handshaking signals. To facilitate the resource allocation
algorithm design, we assume that the transmitter knows that
the eavesdroppers are equipped with single antennas. In addi-
tion, except for the variance, the distribution of the channels
between the transmitter and the passive eavesdroppers is
assumed to be known at the transmitter.
E. Artificial Noise and Energy Signal Generation
In order to provide secure communication and to facilitate
energy harvesting at the desired receivers, artificial noise
signals and energy signals are generated at the transmitter.
In particular, both signals are able to degrade the channels
between the transmitter and the passive eavesdroppers and
5act as energy source for energy harvesting. The transmitter
chooses the transmit signal vector x as
x = ws︸︷︷︸
desired information signal
+ wE︸︷︷︸
energy signal
+ v︸︷︷︸
artificial noise
, (6)
where s ∈ C and w ∈ CNT×1 are the information-bearing sig-
nal and the corresponding beamforming vector for the desired
receiver, respectively. We assume without loss of generally
that E{|s|2} = 1. v ∈ CNT×1 is the artificial noise vector
generated by the transmitter to combat both potential and
passive eavesdroppers. v is modeled as a complex Gaussian
random vector with
v ∼ CN (0,V), (7)
where V ∈ HNT ,V  0, denotes the covariance matrix of
the artificial noise. The artificial noise signal v is unknown to
both the legitimate receivers and passive eavesdroppers. On the
other hand,wE is a Gaussian pseudo-random sequence5 which
is used to facilitate efficient energy transfer and is known to
all legitimate (both active and idle) receivers. wE is modeled
as a complex Gaussian pseudo-random vector with
wE ∼ CN (0,WE), (8)
where WE ∈ HNT ,WE  0 denotes the covariance matrix
of the pseudo-random energy signal.
Remark 1: We assume that energy signal wE is a pseudo-
random signal which is perfectly known at the transmitter and
the desired receivers but not at the passive eavesdroppers. This
can be realized by using a short secret key as seed information
for the pseudo-random sequence generator used for generating
the energy signal sequences, where the transmitter regularly
changes the seeds to prevent the sequence from being cracked
by the passive eavesdroppers. The seeds information used
at the transmitter can be delivered to the desired receivers
securely by exploiting e.g. the reciprocity of the channels
between the transmitter and the legitimated receivers [23].
Remark 2: We note that unlike other system models
adopted in the literature, e.g. [13]–[15], the artificial noise and
energy signals in the considered system can be exploited by the
legitimate receivers. Although the transmitter could also solely
use the energy of the information carrying signal for supplying
energy to the legitimate receivers [5], [7], increasing the
transmit power of the information signal for facilitating energy
harvesting increases the susceptibility to eavesdropping. As a
result, in this paper, we advocate the dual use of artificial noise
signals and energy signals in providing simultaneous security
and efficient energy transfer.
III. RESOURCE ALLOCATION ALGORITHM DESIGN
In this section, we first define the channel capacity and
secrecy capacity as the system performance metrics. Then,
5For energy transfer, the energy sequence is not required to be generated
by a Gaussian pseudo-random source. However, in this paper, a Gaussian
pseudo-random energy sequence is assumed to be able to also provide secure
communication.
we formulate the corresponding resource allocation algorithm
design as an optimization problem. For the sake of notational
simplicity, we define the following variables: H = hhH ,
Gk = gkg
H
k , k ∈ {1, . . . ,K − 1}, and Lj = ljlHj , j ∈
{1, . . . , J}.
A. System Capacity and Secrecy Capacity
The energy signal wE is a Gaussian pseudo-random se-
quence which is only known at the legitimate receivers. Hence,
interference cancellation can be performed at the legitimated
receivers for improving the channel capacity for information
decoding. As a result, given perfect CSI at the receiver, the
channel capacity (bit/s/Hz) between the transmitter and the
desired receiver can be rewritten as
CIC = log2
(
1 + ΓIC
)
and
ΓIC =
ρwHHw
ρ(σ2ant +Tr(HV)) + σ
2
s
, (9)
where ΓIC is the received signal-to-interference-plus-noise
ratio (SINR) at the desired receiver when interference can-
cellation is performed [8], i.e., Tr(HWE) has been removed.
σ2s is the signal processing noise power at the receiver6, cf.
Figure 1. On the other hand, interference cancellation can
also be performed at the idle receivers. Therefore, the channel
capacity between the transmitter and idle receiver (potential
eavesdropper) k is given by
CICIk = log2
(
1 + ΓICk
)
and (10)
ΓICIk =
ρkw
HGkw
ρk(σ2ant +Tr(GkV)) + σ
2
s
(a)
≤
wHGkw
σ2ant +Tr(GkV) + σ
2
s
, (11)
where ρk and ΓICIk are the power splitting ratio and the received
SINR at idle receiver k, respectively. (a) is due to the fact
that ΓICIk is a monotonically increasing function of ρk. The
physical meaning of (11) is that idle receiver k gives up the
opportunity to harvest energy and devotes all the received
power to eavesdropping.
In practice, the transmitter does not know the location of
the passive eavesdroppers. As a result, we design the resource
allocation algorithm assuming an unfavourable scenario for the
location of the passive eavesdroppers. In particular, we assume
that passive eavesdropper j is close to the transmitter and is
located at the reference distance of the path loss model7. Thus,
under this scenario, the capacity between the transmitter and
6We assume that the signal processing and thermal noise characteristics are
identical for all receivers due to similar hardware architectures.
7In practice, the reference distance can be treated as a security guard zone
and we assume it is known that passive eavesdroppers do not exist inside this
zone.
6passive eavesdropper j ∈ {1, . . . , J} is given by
CPEj
(a)
= log2
(
1 + ΓPEj
)
and (12)
ΓPEj =
wHLjw
Tr(LjWE) + Tr(LjV) + σ2ant + σ
2
s
(b)
≤
wHLUPj w
Tr(LUPj WE) + Tr(L
UP
j V) + σ
2
ant + σ
2
s
(13)
(c)
=
wH L˜jw
Tr(L˜jWE) + Tr(L˜jV) + σ˜2j
, (14)
where LUPj = lUPj (lUPj )H , and lUPj is the channel vector
between the transmitter and a passive eavesdropper located at
the reference distance. We note that the elements of lUPj and
lj capture the joint effect of small scale fading and shadowing
in the same manner. Yet, the path loss coefficient contained
in lUPj is calculated at the reference distance which results in
‖lUPj ‖ ≥ ‖lj‖. The equality in (a) is due to the assumption
that the energy signal wE is a Gaussian random signal. The
inequality in (b) is due to the fact that the SINR in (13) is
a monotonically increasing function with respect to Lj and
‖lUPj ‖ ≥ ‖lj‖. On the other hand, L˜j = l˜j˜lHj =
LUPj
E{‖lUP
j
‖2}
and σ˜2j =
σ2
ant
+σ2
s
E{‖lUP
j
‖2}
in (c) denote the normalized channel
matrix and noise power, respectively. Specifically, (c) in (14)
is obtained by dividing8 both the nominator and denominator
of the upper bound SINR by E{‖lUPj ‖2}. Besides, since
E{‖lUP1 ‖
2} = E{‖lUP2 ‖
2} = . . . = E{‖lUPJ ‖
2}, we rewrite
σ˜2j as σ˜
2 in the sequel without loss of generality. We note that
the passive eavesdroppers are unable to perform interference
cancellation to remove Tr(LjWE) since the energy sequence
wE is only known at the legitimate receivers. With a slight
abuse of notation, we reuse variables CICIk and CPEj to denote
their upper bounds by replacing the SINRs ΓICIk and ΓPEj
in (10) and (12) with their upper bounds in (11) and (14),
respectively.
Therefore, the maximum achievable secrecy capacity be-
tween the transmitter and the desired receiver can be expressed
as [13]
Csec
=
[
CIC −max
{
max
k∈{1,...,K−1}
CICIk , maxj∈{1,...,J}
CPEj
}]+
.(15)
Csec quantifies the maximum achievable data rate at which a
transmitter can reliably send secret information to the desired
receiver such that the eavesdroppers are unable to decode
the received signal even if the eavesdroppers have infinite
computational power for decoding the received signals.
Remark 3: Equations (10)–(14) reveal that the artificial
noise signal, v, and the energy signal, wE, have different ef-
fectiveness in providing communication security. In particular,
the artificial noise signal v is able to degrade the channels
of both idle receivers (potential eavesdroppers) and passive
eavesdroppers simultaneously, while wE can only degrade the
channels of the passive eavesdroppers. On the other hand, both
8The normalization facilitates the resource allocation algorithm design in
the later parts of this paper.
v and wE have the same effectiveness in facilitating energy
transfer to the legitimate receivers.
B. Optimization Problem Formulation
The optimal resource allocation policy,
{
w∗, ρ∗,W∗E ,V
∗
}
,
for minimizing the total power radiated by the transmitter, can
be obtained by solving
minimize
WE,V∈HNT ,w,ρ
‖w‖2 +Tr(V) + Tr(WE)
s.t. C1: ρ|h
Hw|2
ρ(σ2ant +Tr(HV)) + σ
2
s
≥ Γreq,
C2: max
∆gk∈Ωk
|gHk w|
2
σ2ant +Tr(GkV) + σ
2
s
≤ Γtolk , ∀k,
C3: Pr
(
max
j∈{1,...,J}
{ wH L˜jw
Tr(L˜jWE)+Tr(L˜jV)+ σ˜2j
}
≤Γtol
)
≥ κ,
C4: (1− ρ)η|hHw|2 + (1 − ρ)η
(
Tr(HV)
+Tr(HWE) + σ
2
ant
)
≥ Pmin,
C5: min
∆gk∈Ωk
η|gHk w|
2 + η
(
Tr(GkV)
+Tr(GkWE) + σ
2
ant
)
≥ Pmink , ∀k,
C6:
[
wwH
]
n,n
+
[
V
]
n,n
+
[
WE
]
n,n
≤ Pmaxn , ∀n ∈ {1, . . . , NT},
C7: 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1, C8: V,WE  0. (16)
In C1, Γreq denotes the minimum SINR of the desired receiver
required for information decoding. This constraint guarantees
that the channel capacity between the transmitter and the
desired receiver is CIC ≥ log2(1 + Γreq). Constraint C2 is
imposed such that for a given CSI uncertainty set Ωk, the max-
imum received SINR at idle receiver (potential eavesdropper)
k is less than the maximum tolerable received SINR Γtolk .
In practice, the transmitter sets Γreq ≫ Γtolk > 0, ∀k ∈
{1, . . . ,K−1}, to ensure secure communication. Specifically,
if the above optimization problem is feasible and passive
eavesdroppers do not exist in the system, the adopted problem
formulation guarantees that the secrecy capacity is bounded
below by Csec ≥ log2(1+Γreq)− log2(1+max
k
{Γtolk}) ≥ 0.
We note that although Γreq and Γtolk in C1 and C2, respec-
tively, are not optimization variables in this paper, a balance
between secrecy capacity and system capacity can be struck
by varying their values. In C3, Γtol represents the maximum
received SINR tolerance for successfully decoding at passive
eavesdropper j. This constraint specifies the minimum outage
requirement at all passive eavesdroppers. In particular, the
maximum received SINR among all passive eavesdroppers
is required to be smaller than the maximum tolerable re-
ceived SINR9 Γtol with at least probability κ. For instance,
if κ = 0.99, Γreq ≥ Γtol, and an idle receiver does not exist
9In fact, the system operator can adjust the values of the maximum received
SINR tolerance Γtol to account for performance variations due to potential
system model mismatches such as the assumption that wE is Gaussian
distributed.
7in the system, constraints C1 and C3 together guarantee that
the secrecy capacity between the transmitter and the desired
receiver is bounded below by Csec = log2(1 + Γreq) −
log2(1 + max
j
{
ΓPEj
}
) ≥ log2(1 + Γreq) − log2(1 + Γtol)
with probability 0.99. We note that the proposed problem
formulation and resource allocation schemes are also valid
for κ = 0. Specifically, for κ = 0 and continuous random
variables ΓPEj ∈ (0,∞), constraint C3 is always satisfied.
Hence, for κ = 0, constraint C3 can be safely removed
from the optimization problem formulation without loss of
optimality. Besides, although the number of eavesdroppers J is
not known at the transmitter, J in C3 represents the maximum
tolerable number of passive eavesdroppers that the transmitter
can handle. Furthermore, we note that we do not maximize
the secrecy capacity in this paper as this would not necessarily
lead to a power efficient resource allocation. Pmin and Pmink
in C4 and C5 set the minimum required power transfer to the
desired information receiver and idle receiver k, respectively.
We note that for given CSI uncertainty sets Ωk, ∀k, the
transmitter can only guarantee the minimum required power
transfer to the K−1 idle receivers if they use all their received
power for energy harvesting, i.e., the idle receivers do not
intend to eavesdrop. η in C4 and C5 denotes the energy
harvesting efficiency of the receivers in converting the received
radio signal to electrical energy. Furthermore, in practice, each
transmit antenna has its own power amplifier in its analog
front-end in practice, cf. Figure 1. Hence, the power radiated
by each antenna is limited by the maximum transmit power of
each power amplifier. In C6, we take this physical limitation
into account by limiting the maximum transmit power from
antenna n to Pmaxn . We note that the introduction of a joint
power consumption constraint for all power amplifiers is not
necessary as long as
∑NT
n=1 Pmaxn ≤ PPG, where PPG is
the maximum power supply at the transmitter. C7 is the
boundary constraint for the power splitting variable ρ. C8
and V,WE ∈ HNT constrain matrices V and WE to be
positive semi-definite Hermitian matrices such that both are
valid covariance matrices.
Remark 4: We would like to emphasize that the considered
problem formulation is a generalization of the cases where
only artificial noise or only energy signal allocation are
performed. If wE is not known at the legitimate receivers,
it cannot be cancelled at the legitimate receivers. In this case,
we can set wE = 0 in the problem formulation without loss
of optimality. This is because if wE 6= 0 and interference
cancellation cannot be performed, we can define a new re-
source allocation policy with a new artificial noise signal,
vnew = v +wE, and a new energy signal, wEnew = 0, such
that the new resource allocation policy consumes the same
amount of energy as the original solution and satisfies all the
constraints.
IV. SOLUTION OF THE OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM
The optimization problem in (16) is a non-convex quadrat-
ically constrained quadratic program (QCQP) which involves
chance constrained programming [24], [25] and semi-infinite
programming. In particular, the non-convexity with respect to
the beamforming vector w for the information signal and the
power splitting ratio ρ is due to constraints C1 and C4. Be-
sides, constraints C2 and C5 involve infinitely many inequality
constraints due to the continuity of the CSI uncertainty sets.
Furthermore, the probabilistic (chance) constraint C3 couples
all optimization variables and is non-convex. In general, even
if we remove chance constraint C3, there is no standard
approach for solving non-convex optimization problems. In
some extreme cases, an exhaustive search approach is required
to obtain a globally optimal solution which is computationally
intractable even for a moderate system size. In order to derive
an efficient resource allocation algorithm for the considered
problem, we first recast the original problem as a semi-
definite programming (SDP) problem in order to avoid the
non-convexity associated with constraints C1 and C4. Then,
we convert the infinite number of constraints in C2 and C5
into an equivalent finite number of constraints. Subsequently,
we propose a tractable convex constraint as a replacement
for non-convex constraint C3. The reformulated problem with
constraint replacement serves as a performance lower bound
for the original problem formulation. Finally, we use semi-
definite programming relaxation (SDR) [26], [27] to obtain
the optimal resource allocation solution for the reformulated
problem. In practice, the considered problem may be infeasible
when the QoS requirements are stringent and/or the channels
are in unfavourable conditions. However, in the sequel, we
assume that the problem is always feasible for studying the
design of different resource allocation schemes.
A. Semi-definite Programming Relaxation
To facilitate SDP relaxation, we define W = wwH and
rewrite problem (16) in terms of W as
minimize
W,V,WE∈HNT ,ρ
Tr(W) + Tr(V) + Tr(WE)
s.t. C1: Tr(HW)
σ2ant +Tr(HV) +
σ2
s
ρ
≥ Γreq,
C2: max
∆gk∈Ωk
Tr(GkW)
σ2ant +Tr(GkV) + σ
2
s
≤ Γtolk , ∀k,
C3: Pr
(
max
j∈{1,...,J}
{ Tr(L˜jW)
Tr(L˜jWE) + Tr(L˜jV) + σ˜2j
}
≤Γtol
)
≥ κ,
C4: Tr(HW) + Tr(HWE) + Tr(HV)
+σ2ant ≥
Pmin
(1 − ρ)η
,
C5: min
∆gk∈Ωk
Tr(GkW) + Tr(GkV) + Tr(GkWE)
+σ2ant ≥
Pmink
η
, ∀k,
C6: Tr
(
Ψn
(
W+V+WE
))
≤ Pmaxn , ∀n∈{1, . . . , NT},
C7: 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1, C8: W  0,V  0,WE  0,
C9: Rank(W) = 1, (17)
where W  0, W ∈ HNT , and Rank(W) = 1 in (17) are
imposed to guarantee that W = wwH holds after optimizing
W. We note that the per-antenna radiated power in constraint
8C6 in (16) can be represented as Tr
(
Ψn
(
W +V +WE
))
,
where Ψn = eneHn and en ∈ RNT×1 is the n-th unit vector
of length NT, i.e.,
[
en
]
n,1
= 1 and
[
en
]
b,1
= 0, ∀b 6= n, b ∈
{1, . . . , NT}. After variable transformation W = wwH and
some manipulations, it can be observed that constraints C1
and C4 are convex with respect to {W,V,WE, ρ}. Next, we
handle constraints C2 and C5. Although constraints C2 and
C5 are convex with respect to the optimization variables (after
some mathematical manipulations), they are semi-infinite con-
straints which are generally intractable for resource allocation
algorithm design. To facilitate the solution, we transform
constraints C2 and C5 into linear matrix inequalities (LMIs)
using the following lemma:
Lemma 1 (S-Procedure [28]): Let a function fm(x),m ∈
{1, 2},x ∈ CN×1, be defined as
fm(x) = x
HAmx+ 2Re{b
H
mx}+ cm, (18)
where Am ∈ HN , bm ∈ CN×1, and cm ∈ R1×1. Then, the
implication f1(x) ≤ 0⇒ f2(x) ≤ 0 holds if and only if there
exists a δ ≥ 0 such that
δ
[
A1 b1
bH1 c1
]
−
[
A2 b2
bH2 c2
]
 0, (19)
provided that there exists a point xˆ such that fk(xˆ) < 0.
As a result, we can apply Lemma 1 to constraint C2. In
particular, we substitute gk = gˆk + ∆gk in constraint C2.
Therefore, the implication
∆gHk ∆gk ≤ ε
2
k (20)
⇒ 0 ≥ ∆gHk
( W
Γtolk
−V
)
∆gk+2Re
{ˆ
gHk
( W
Γtolk
−V
)
∆gk
}
+gˆHk
( W
Γtolk
−V
)
gˆk−σ
2
ant−σ
2
s , ∀k,
holds if and only if there exist δk ≥ 0, k ∈ {1, . . . ,K − 1},
such that the following LMI constraints hold:
C2: SC2k
(
W,V, δk
)
=
[
δkINT +V Vgˆk
gˆHk V −δkε
2
k + σ
2
ant + σ
2
s + gˆ
H
k Vgˆk
]
−
1
Γtolk
UHgkWUgk  0, ∀k, (21)
where Ugk =
[
INT gˆk
]
. Similarly, by using Lemma 1,
constraint C5 can be equivalently written as
C5: SC5k (W,V,WE, νk) (22)
=
[
νkINT +V Vgˆk
gˆHk V −νkε
2
k −
Pmin
η + σ
2
ant + gˆ
H
k Vgˆk
]
+ UHgkWEUgk +U
H
gk
WUgk  0, ∀k,
for νk ≥ 0, k ∈ {1, . . . ,K − 1}. We note that now constraints
C2 and C5 involve only a finite number of constraints which
facilitates the resource allocation algorithm design.
The third obstacle in solving (17) is the probabilistic
(chance) constraint C3 and the problem formulation is known
as chance constrained programming. In general, constraint C3
is non-convex since the optimization variables are coupled. To
overcome this problem, we introduce the following lemma.
Lemma 2: Assuming the normalized upper bound channel
gain vectors of the passive eavesdroppers, L˜j , j ∈ {1, . . . , J},
can be modeled as independent and identical distributed (i.i.d.)
Rayleigh random variables10, the following constraint impli-
cation holds:
C3:
(
Φ−1NT(1− κ
1/J )Γtolσ˜
2
)
INT
 W−ΓtolWE−ΓtolV (23)
=⇒ C3: Pr
(
max
j∈{1,...,J}
{
ΓPE,j
}
≤ Γtol
)
≥ κ, (24)
where Φ−1NT(·) denotes the inverse cumulative distribution
function (c.d.f.) of an inverse central chi-square random vari-
able with 2NT degrees of freedom.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix A for a proof of Lemma
2. 
As a result, we can replace11 the chance constraint C3 with
the constraint in (23). Constraint C3 is tractable in the sense
that: (i) a feasible solution point satisfying (23) is also feasible
for C3, and (ii) the new constraint in (23) is convex with
respect to the optimization variables [28]. Thus, substituting
(21) and (22) into (17) and replacing constraint C3 by (23),
we obtain the following optimization problem:
minimize
W,V,WE∈HNT ,ρ,δ,ν
Tr(W) + Tr(V) + Tr(WE)
s.t. C1, C4, C6, C7, C8,
C2: SC2k (W,V, δk)  0, ∀k,
C3:
(
Φ−1NT(1−κ
1/J)Γtolσ˜
2
)
INTW−ΓtolWE−ΓtolV,
C5: SC5k (W,V,WE, νk)  0, ∀k,
C9: Rank(W) = 1, C10: δk, νk ≥ 0, ∀k, (25)
where δ and ν are auxiliary optimization variable vectors,
whose elements δk ≥ 0, k ∈ {1, . . . ,K − 1}, and νk ≥
0, k ∈ {1, . . . ,K − 1}, were introduced in (21) and (22),
respectively. Now, C9:Rank( W) = 1 is the remaining
obstacle in solving the problem in (25). By relaxing constraint
C9: Rank(W) = 1, i.e., removing it from the problem
formulation, the considered problem becomes a convex SDP
which can be solved efficiently by numerical solvers such as
SeDuMi [32] and SDPT3 [33]. From the basic principles of
optimization theory, if the obtained solution W for the relaxed
problem admits a rank-one matrix, then it is the optimal
solution of the original problem in (25). Then, the optimal w
can be obtained by performing eigenvalue decomposition on
10We assume that the passive eavesdroppers are not collaborating and are
physically separated by a distance of at least half a wavelength. For a carrier
frequency of 470 MHz, half of a wavelength is roughly equal to 30 cm
which is a reasonable assumption for the minimum receiver separation in
practice. Besides, we assume that there is a sufficient number of scatterers in
the channels between the transmitter and the passive eavesdroppers such that
these channels can be modelled as Rayleigh distribution due to the central
limit theorem [29]. These assumptions are commonly used in the literature
[30], [31] when studying resource allocation algorithm design for providing
physical layer security.
11 We note that a resource allocation policy which satisfies constraint C3
also satisfies C3, but not vice versa. In other words, replacing constraint
C3 with C3 results in a smaller feasible solution set for optimization which
leads to a lower bound system performance. To quantify the impact of the
constraint restriction, the resulting performance loss is quantified in Section
V via simulations.
9W. However, it is known that the constraint relaxation may not
be tight and Rank(W) > 1 may occur. In the following, we
will first reveal a sufficient condition for Rank(W) = 1 for the
relaxed problem. Then, we propose a method for constructing
an optimal solution for the relaxed version of (25) with a
rank-one matrix W. Furthermore, we exploit the sufficient
condition of the optimal solution and use it as a building block
for the design of a suboptimal resource allocation algorithm,
which requires a lower computational complexity than the
construction of the rank-one solution.
B. Optimality Conditions for SDP Relaxation
In this subsection, we first reveal the tightness of the
proposed SDP relaxation. Then, we study a sufficient condition
for obtaining an optimal solution which will be used to design
a low complexity suboptimal resource allocation scheme.
First, we introduce a theorem which reveals the tightness
of the SDP relaxation. This theorem closely follows a similar
theorem in [17, Proposition 4.1]12.
Theorem 1: Suppose the optimal solution of the re-
laxed version of (25) is denoted as {W∗,V∗,W∗E, ρ∗,
δ∗,ν∗},Γreq > 0, and Rank(W∗) > 1. Then, there
exists a feasible solution of (25), denoted as {W˜∗, V˜∗,
W˜∗E, ρ˜
∗, δ˜
∗
, ν˜
∗}, which not only achieves the same objective
value as {W∗,V∗,W∗E, ρ∗, δ
∗,ν∗}, but also admits a rank-
one matrix W˜∗, i.e., Rank(W˜∗) = 1.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix B for a proof of Theorem
1 and the method for constructing {W˜∗, V˜∗,W˜∗E, ρ˜∗, δ˜
∗
, ν˜
∗}
with Rank(W˜∗) = 1. 
As discussed in Appendix B, constructing an optimal so-
lution set {W˜∗, V˜∗,W˜∗E, ρ˜∗, δ˜
∗
, ν˜
∗} with Rank( W˜∗) = 1
may require the solution of the dual problem and one extra
optimization problem, cf. Remark 6. Besides, knowledge of
the Lagrange multiplier matrix Y∗ is required for constructing
the rank-one solution which may not be provided by some nu-
merical solvers. Furthermore, the associated signal processing
delay and computational complexity may not be affordable
when the transmitter has limited signal processing capability.
Thus, in the following, we present a sufficient condition for
obtaining a rank-one matrix solutionW for the relaxed version
of problem (25) which will also be used for designing a low
complexity suboptimal resource allocation algorithm.
Proposition 1: Consider the relaxed version of problem
(25) for Γreq > 0 and denote D∗C2k and D
∗
C5k
as the optimal
Lagrange multiplier matrices associated with constraints C2
and C5, respectively. A sufficient condition for Rank(W∗) =
1 is that
D∗
C2k
Γtolk
−D∗C5k
 0, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K − 1}, holds.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix C for a proof of Proposition
1. 
Intuitively, when the requirement in constraint C5 becomes
less stringent, i.e., Pmink → 0, the corresponding Lagrange
multiplier matrix D∗C5k → 0 since the constraint is less
12We note that the theorem in [17, Proposition 4.1] considers a commu-
nication system with separated receivers for the case of perfect CSI and
without passive eavesdroppers. In fact, the results of [17] cannot be directly
applied to the system model considered in this paper without the steps and
transformations introduced in Sections II to IV-A.
often active. As a result, the SDP relaxation algorithm has a
higher chance of obtaining a rank-one matrix solution and thus
achieves the global optimum with respect to the reformulated
problem.
Remark 5: We would like to emphasize that although
Proposition 1 provides a sufficient condition for a rank-one
matrix solution under SDP relaxation, we found by simulation
that the proposed SDP relaxation may result in a rank-one
matrix W∗ even if the sufficient condition does not hold.
Suboptimal resource allocation scheme: According to
Proposition 1, the solution of (25) has a rank-one W∗ when
constraint C5 is not active, i.e., D∗C5k = 0, ∀k, or constraintC5 is independent of optimization variable W. For facilitating
an efficient resource allocation algorithm design, we replace
constraint C5 in (25) by C5 and the new optimization problem
becomes
minimize
W,V,WE∈HNT ,ρ,δ,ν
Tr(W) + Tr(V) + Tr(WE)
s.t. C1, C2, C3, C4 – C8, C10,
C5: S˜C5k (V,WE, νk)
=
[
νkINT +V Vgˆk
gˆHk V −νkε
2
k −
Pmin
η + σ
2
ant + gˆ
H
k Vgˆk
]
+ UHgkWEUgk  0, ∀k. (26)
Compared to constraint C5, the new constraint C5 reduces
the feasible solution set for (25) as the contribution of the
information signal to the energy harvesting, i.e., W, at idle
receiver k is neglected. Thus, the obtained solution of problem
(26) serves as a performance lower bound for the reformulated
optimization problem (25). We note that the new constraint
preserves the convexity of the relaxed problem and (26) can be
solved efficiently via SDP relaxation and the aforementioned
numerical solvers. Furthermore, it can be shown that the
obtained solution13 of problem (26) has always a rank-one
beamforming matrix, i.e., Rank(W) = 1, even though SDP
relaxation is applied.
V. RESULTS
In this section, we evaluate the system performance for
the proposed resource allocation schemes using simulations.
The TGn path loss model [34] for indoor communications is
adopted with a carrier center frequency of 470 MHz [35].
The directional joint transmit and receive antenna gain is 10
dB. The reference distance of the path loss model is 2 meters
and there are K receivers uniformly distributed between the
reference distance and the maximum service distance of 20
meters. The wavelength of the carrier signal is 0.6 meter
which is smaller than the minimum distance between the
transmitter and the receivers. Thus, the far-field assumption for
the channel model in [34] holds. The transmitter is equipped
with NT antennas. The small scale fading coefficients between
13We can follow a similar approach as in Appendix C to examine the
KKT conditions for the new problem formulation in (26). In particular, the
sufficient condition for a rank-one matrix solution stated in Proposition 1
is always satisfied for the new problem formulation since constraint C5 is
independent of W.
10
10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30
16
18
20
22
24
26
28
Minimum required SINR of desired receiver Γ
req (dB)
Av
er
ag
e 
to
ta
l t
ra
ns
m
it 
po
we
r (
dB
m)
 
 
24 24.5
19.3
19.35
19.4
19.45
Baseline 2, σ
est
k
2
 = 10%
Baseline 1, σ
est
k
2
 = 10%
Baseline 2, σ
est
k
2
 = 5%
Baseline 1, σ
est
k
2
 = 5%
Suboptimal scheme, σ
est
k
2
 = 10%
SDP, σ
est
k
2
 = 10%
Benchmark, σ
est
k
2
 = 10%
Suboptimal scheme, σ
est
k
2
 = 5%
SDP, σ
est
k
2
 = 5%
Benchmark, σ
est
k
2
 = 5%
Proposed schemes, σ
est
k
2
 = 10%
Baseline 1Power saving
Baseline 2
Proposed schemes, σ
est
k
2
 = 5%
Fig. 2. Average total transmit power (dBm) versus the minimum required SINR of the desired receiver, Γreq (dB), for different resource allocation schemes.
The double-sided arrows indicate the power savings achieved by the proposed schemes compared to the baseline schemes.
the transmitter and the legitimate receivers are generated as in-
dependent and identically distributed Rician random variables
with Rician factor 6 dB. The corresponding shadowing effect
is assumed to be 0 dB. On the other hand, we assume that
there are J = 5 eavesdroppers eavesdropping the information
from outdoors. Thus, the multipath fading coefficients between
the transmitter and the J passive eavesdroppers are modeled
as Rayleigh random variables. We set κ = 0.99 for providing
secure communication. We assume that the signal processing
noise power14 and the antenna noise power are σ2s = −35
dBm and σ2ant = −111 dBm, respectively. Unless specified
otherwise, we assume a minimum required power transfer
of Pmin = Pmink = 0 dBm, ∀k, and an energy harvesting
efficiency of η = 0.5. On the other hand, the maximum SINR
tolerance of each idle receiver (potential eavesdropper) and
passive eavesdropper is set to Γtolk = Γtol = 0 dB. The
maximum transmit power per-antenna is set to Pmaxn = 30
dBm, ∀n ∈ {1, . . . , NT}. To facilitate the presentation in
the sequel, we define the normalized maximum channel es-
timation error of idle receiver k as σ2estk =
ε2k
‖gk‖2
where
σ2esta = σ
2
estb , ∀a, b ∈ {1, . . . ,K − 1}. The average system
performance shown in the following sections is obtained by
averaging over different realizations of both path loss and
multipath fading.
14We assume that the signal processing noise power at each receiver is due
to quantization noise in the analog-to-digital (ADC) converter. Specifically,
a 10-bit uniform quantizer is used for quantizing the received signal at the
receivers.
A. Average Total Transmit Power versus Minimum Required
SINR
Figure 2 depicts the average total transmit power versus the
minimum required SINR of the desired receiver, Γreq, for K =
4 legitimate receivers, different resource allocation schemes,
and different normalized maximum channel estimation errors,
σ2estk . The transmitter has NT = 6 transmit antennas. It can be
observed that the average total transmit power of the proposed
SDP resource allocation scheme is a monotonically non-
decreasing function of Γreq. This is attributed to the fact that a
higher transmit power is necessary for satisfying constraint C1
when the minimum SINR requirement of Γreq becomes more
stringent. Besides, it can be seen that the average total transmit
power increases for increasing normalized maximum channel
estimation errors, σ2estk . In fact, with increasing imperfectness
of the channel estimation, the transmitter has to allocate more
power to the artificial noise and the energy signal to prevent in-
terception by potential eavesdroppers and to facilitate efficient
energy transfer for fulling constraints C2 and C5, respectively.
Furthermore, we investigate the performance loss incurred by
replacing the non-convex probabilistic constraint C3 with the
proposed convex deterministic constraint C3, cf. Lemma 2 and
(25), in Figure 2. In particular, we compare the performance of
the proposed optimal SDP resource allocation scheme obtained
based on (25) with that of a benchmark system. Specifically,
the performance of the benchmark system is computed by
solving (16) for κ = 0 in constraint C3. In other words, we
assume that the passive eavesdropper does not exist in the
system. Thus, the performance gap between the curves of the
SDP resource allocation scheme and the benchmark system
constitutes an upper bound on the performance loss incurred
11
by the constraint replacement. Figure 2 shows that for a wide
range of minimum required SINRs of the desired receiver,
the performance loss is less than 0.1 dB, despite the fact that
the reformulated problem guarantees communication security
robustness against passive eavesdropping.
For comparison, Figure 2 also contains the average total
transmit power of the proposed suboptimal scheme and two
baseline resource allocation schemes. For baseline scheme 1,
we adopt an isotropic radiation pattern for WE as the CSI of
the passive eavesdroppers is not known at the transmitter [13].
Then, we minimize the total transmitted power by optimizing
W,V, ρ, δ,ν, and the power allocated to wE subject to the
same constraints as in (25) via SDP relaxation. For baseline
scheme 2, we adopt maximum ratio transmission (MRT) [2]
for delivering the information signal to the desired legitimate
receiver. Similar to baseline scheme 1, an isotropic radiation
pattern is adopted for the energy signal. Then, we optimize
the power allocated to WE, the MRT beamforming matrix
W, V, ρ, δ, and ν for minimization of the total transmit
power subject to the same constraints as in (25). It can be
seen that the proposed suboptimal scheme closely approaches
the performance of the benchmark system and the performance
achieved by SDP relaxation of the reformulated problem, de-
spite the fact that the proposed suboptimal scheme employs a
smaller feasible solution set compared to the original problem
formulation in (16). On the other hand, it can be observed that
the lower computational complexity of the baseline schemes
comes at the expense of a significantly higher transmit power
compared to the other schemes. Indeed, the proposed SDP
resource allocation scheme and the suboptimal scheme fully
utilize the CSI of all communication links and optimize the
space spanned by the energy signal and the artificial noise
for performing resource allocation. On the contrary, for the
baseline schemes, the transmitter is unable to fully exploit the
available degrees of freedom in resource allocation since the
energy signal is radiated isotropically and/or W is fixed. Yet,
even though the available CSI at the transmitter is imperfect,
all the schemes (including the baseline schemes) are able
to fulfill the QoS requirements due to the proposed robust
resource allocation algorithm design and the optimization of
the artificial noise covariance matrix V.
Figure 3(a) and Figure 3(b) illustrate the average system
secrecy capacity versus the minimum required SINR of the
desired receiver, Γreq, for K = 4 receivers, NT = 6 transmit
antennas, different resource allocation schemes, and different
normalized maximum channel estimation errors, σ2estk . It can
be seen that the average system secrecy capacity, i.e., Csec,
increases with Γreq since the maximum tolerable SINRs of
the idle receivers are constrained to Γtolk = 0 dB. Besides, as
expected, the baseline schemes achieve on average a higher
secrecy capacity in the high transmit power regime compared
to the other schemes. However, the superior performance in
terms of secrecy capacity comes at the expense of an exceed-
ingly high transmit power, cf. Figure 2, since the transmitter
is forced to transmit more artificial noise and a stronger
energy signal for delivering energy to the idle receivers. On
the other hand, the normalized maximum channel estimation
errors σ2estk do not have a large impact on the average secrecy
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Fig. 3. Average system secrecy capacity (bit/s/Hz) versus the minimum
required SINR of the desired receiver, Γreq (dB), for different normalized
maximum channel estimation errors σ2estk , and different resource allocation
schemes.
capacity of the system and all schemes are able to guarantee
the secrecy QoS because of the proposed robust optimization.
B. Average Total Transmit Power versus Number of Transmit
Antennas
Figure 4(a) shows the average total transmit power versus
the number of transmit antennas, NT, for K = 4 legitimate
receivers, different resource allocation schemes, and a normal-
ized maximum channel estimation error of σ2estk = 5%, ∀k.
The minimum required SINR of the desired receiver is set to
Γreq = 15 dB. It is expected that the total transmit power
decreases with an increasing number of antennas since extra
degrees of freedom can be exploited for resource allocation
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when more antennas are available at the transmitter. On the
other hand, the proposed schemes provide substantial power
savings compared to the two baseline schemes due to the
optimization of both W and WE. Figure 4(b) depicts the
average transmit power allocation to the three components
of the transmitted signal, i.e., Tr(W),Tr(V), and Tr(WE),
versus the number of transmit antennas for the proposed
SDP resource allocation scheme and baseline scheme 2 under
the same system setting as considered in Figure 4(a). It
can be observed that the amounts of power allocated to the
information signal and the artificial noise decrease rapidly
for the SDP resource allocation scheme as the number of
transmit antennas increases. In fact, the degrees of freedom
for resource allocation increase with the number of transmit
antennas. Specifically, with more antennas, the transmitter is
able to perform more power efficient beamforming of the
information signal and more effective jamming of the potential
and passive eavesdroppers. Besides, the power allocated to the
energy signal decreases with increasing NT but not as fast as
the artificial noise power. This is because the energy signal has
less influence on the system performance than the artificial
noise. In particular, the energy signal does not degrade the
received SINRs at the potential eavesdroppers. On the other
hand, the powers allocated to the information signal and the
artificial noise do not vary significantly with NT in baseline
scheme 2 since the transmitter is unable to fully exploit the
extra degrees of freedom introduced by additional transmit
antennas.
C. Average Total Transmit Power versus Number of Legitimate
Receivers
Figure 5(a) shows the average total transmit power versus
the number of legitimate receivers, K , for a normalized maxi-
mum channel estimation error of σ2estk = 5%, ∀k, and different
resource allocation schemes. The minimum required SINR of
the desired receiver is set to Γreq = 15 dB and there are
NT = 6 transmit antennas. It is expected that the total transmit
power increases with the number of legitimate receivers.
The reason behind this is twofold. First, as the number of
legitimate receivers in the system increases, there are more idle
receivers requiring power transfer from the transmitter even
though some of them are experiencing bad channel conditions.
Second, there are more potential eavesdroppers present in
the system and thus the transmitter has to generate a higher
amount of artificial noise to guarantee communication secrecy.
On the other hand, the proposed schemes provide substantial
power savings compared to the two baseline schemes. Figure
5(b) shows the average transmit power allocated the different
components of the transmitted signal. We focus on the power
allocation for the proposed SDP resource allocation scheme
and baseline scheme 2. It can be observed that a large portion
of power is allocated to the energy signal and artificial noise
in both schemes. This is due to the fact that when there are
more potential eavesdroppers (idle legitimate receivers) in the
system, the secrecy QoS and energy harvesting requirements
dominate the system performance as constraints C2 and C5
become more stringent. This translates to a higher demand
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Fig. 4. Average total transmit power (dBm) and average transmit power
allocation (dBm) versus the number of transmit antennas, NT, for Γreq = 15
dB, a normalized maximum channel estimation error of σ2estk = 5%, anddifferent resource allocation schemes. The double-sided arrows indicate the
power savings achieved by the proposed schemes compared to the baseline
schemes.
for artificial noise and energy signal generation (/radiation)
for degrading the channels of the potential eavesdroppers and
facilitating efficient power transfer. Besides, it is interesting to
note that the amount of power allocated by baseline scheme
2 to the information signal decreases with increasing number
of legitimate receivers. This result suggests that with MRT
allocating a larger amount of power to the information signal is
not effective in minimizing the total transmit power. Instead, a
larger portion of the transmit power should be allocated to the
artificial noise and the energy signal for jamming the channel
of the potential eavesdroppers when there are more legitimate
receivers in the system.
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Fig. 5. Average total transmit power (dBm) versus the number of legitimate
receivers, K , for Γreq = 15 dB, a normalized maximum channel estimation
error of σ2estk = 5%, and different resource allocation schemes. The double-
sided arrows indicate the power savings achieved by the proposed schemes
compared to the baseline schemes.
D. Average Total Harvested Power
Figure 6(a) shows the average total harvested power versus
the minimum required SINR of the desired receiver, Γreq, for
K = 4 legitimate receivers, NT = 6 transmit antennas, dif-
ferent normalized maximum channel estimation errors, σ2estk ,
and different resource allocation schemes. The average total
harvested power is computed by assuming the potential eaves-
droppers do not eavesdrop. It can be observed that the total
average harvested power increases with Γreq. On the one hand,
the transmitter has to allocate more power to the information
bearing signal to satisfy a more stringent requirement on Γreq.
On the other hand, the power of the artificial noise and energy
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Fig. 6. Average total harvested power (dBm) versus the minimum required
SINR of the desired receiver, Γreq (dB), and the number of transmit antennas,
NT, respectively, for K = 4 legitimate receivers.
signal may also increase to reduce the received SINRs at both
the potential eavesdroppers and the passive eavesdroppers. As
a result, for larger Γreq, more power is available in the RF and
can be harvested by the legitimate receivers. Besides, it can
be observed that the average total harvested power increases
with increasing σ2estk . In fact, to fulfill the QoS requirements
on the minimum power transfer and communication secrecy,
a higher amount of transmit power is required for larger
σ2estk which leads to a higher energy level in the RF for
energy harvesting. Figure 6(b) illustrates the average total
harvested power versus the number of transmit antennas, NT,
for K = 4 legitimate receivers, Γreq = 15 dB, different
normalized maximum channel estimation errors, σ2estk , and
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different resource allocation schemes. It can be observed that
the average total harvested power in the system decreases with
increasing number of antennas for all considered scenarios.
These results suggest that a lower amount of energy is
available in the RF for energy harvesting when the number
of transmit antennas increases. This is due to the fact that
with more transmit antennas the direction of beamforming
matrix W can be more accurately steered towards the desired
receiver which reduces the power leakage of W to the idle
receivers for energy harvesting. Besides, by exploiting the
extra degrees of freedoms introduced by additional transmit
antennas, the artificial noise and energy signal powers radiated
from the transmitter to fulfill the secrecy QoS requirements
can be reduced which further decreases the amount of energy
available in the RF for energy harvesting. Yet, because of
the proposed optimization, the proposed schemes are able
to guarantee the minimum required power transfer to the
legitimate receivers for all the cases studied.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we formulated the resource allocation algo-
rithm design for secure MISO communication systems with
RF energy harvesting receivers as a non-convex optimization
problem. The proposed problem formulation advocates the
dual use of artificial noise and energy signals for facilitat-
ing simultaneous secure communication and efficient energy
transfer in the presence of both passive eavesdroppers and po-
tential eavesdroppers. Due to the intractability of the resulting
power minimization problem, the problem was reformulated
by replacing a non-convex probabilistic constraint with a con-
vex deterministic constraint. Subsequently, an efficient SDP
based resource allocation algorithm was proposed to obtain
the global optimal solution for the reformulated problem.
Besides a suboptimal low computational complexity resource
allocation scheme was provided. Simulation results showed the
excellent performance of all the proposed resource allocation
schemes. Furthermore, our results also unveiled the power
savings enabled by the optimization of the artificial noise and
energy signal generation. An interesting topic for future work
is the consideration of multiple antennas eavesdroppers and
multiple desired receivers.
VII. APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 2
Since the channels of the J passive eavesdroppers are
independent, the left hand side of constraint C3 in (17) can
be written as
Pr
(
max
j∈{1,...,J}
{
ΓPE,j
}
≤ Γtol
)
=
J∏
j=1
Pr
(
ΓPE,j ≤ Γtol
)
. (27)
Thus, after some mathematical manipulations, constraint C3
is equivalent to
C3: Pr
(
max
j∈{1,...,J}
{
ΓPE,j
}
≤ Γtol
)
≥ κ (28)
⇔ Pr
(
Γtolσ˜
2 ≥ Tr
(
L˜(W − ΓtolWE − ΓtolV)
))
≥ κ1/J .
Since the equivalent channels of the passive eavesdroppers are
modeled as i.i.d. random variables, we have dropped the index
of the passive eavesdropper channels in (28) without loss of
generality. Now, we focus on the calculation of the probability
Pr
(
Γtolσ˜
2 ≥ Tr
(
L˜(W − ΓtolWE − ΓtolV)
))
. It can be
shown that the distribution of random variable Tr
(
L˜(W −
ΓtolWE − ΓtolV)
)
is the same as that of random variable
NT∑
n=1
χ2nλn
(
W − ΓtolWE − ΓtolV
) (29)
where χ2n, n ∈ {1, . . . , NT}, are i.i.d. exponential random
variables with probability density function fχ2n(x) = exp(−x)
for x ≥ 0. It can be seen in (29) that the χ2n are coupled
with the optimization variable matrices and the distribution
of the random variable in (29) depends on the value of
the optimization variables {W,WE,V}. On the other hand,
the calculation of the optimization variables depends on the
distribution of random variable in (29). This mutual de-
pendence does not facilitate an efficient resource allocation
algorithm design. Besides, matrix W−ΓtolWE−ΓtolV is in
general indefinite and the resulting probability distribution of
Tr
(
L˜(W−ΓtolWE−ΓtolV)
)
may not be a convex function.
As a comprise solution, we focus on a smaller convex feasible
solution set which facilitates a tractable solution. We first
introduce a trace inequality for the product of two arbitrary
Hermitian matrices [36]. In particular, for any two Hermitian
matrices A ∈ HN and B ∈ HN , the following inequality
holds:
N∑
n=1
λn(A)λN−n+1(B) ≤ Tr(AB) ≤
N∑
n=1
λn(A)λn(B). (30)
Then, an upper bound for function Tr
(
L˜(W − ΓtolWE −
ΓtolV)
)
is given by
Tr
(
L˜(W − ΓtolWE − ΓtolV)
)
(a)
≤
NT∑
n=1
λn(L˜)λn(W − ΓtolWE − ΓtolV)
(b)
= λmax(L˜)λmax(W − ΓtolWE − ΓtolV)
(c)
= Tr(L˜)λmax(W − ΓtolWE − ΓtolV), (31)
where (a) is due to the right hand side inequality in (30) while
(b) and (c) are due to the fact that L˜ is a rank-one positive
semi-definite matrix. Thus, by combining (27), (28), and (31),
we obtain the following inequality:
Pr
(
Tr
(
L˜(W − ΓtolWE − ΓtolV)
)
≤ Γtolσ˜
2
)
≥ Pr
(
λmax(W − ΓtolWE − ΓtolV)Tr(L˜) ≤ Γtolσ˜
2
)
. (32)
As a result, by setting Pr
(
λmax(W − ΓtolWE −
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ΓtolV)Tr(L˜) ≤ Γtolσ˜2
)
≥ κ1/J , we have
Pr
(
λmax(Q)Tr(L˜) ≤ Γtolσ˜
2
)
≥ κ1/J (33a)
(d)
⇐⇒ Pr
(λmax(Q)
Γtolσ˜2
≤
1
Tr(L˜)
)
≥ κ1/J (33b)
(e)
⇐⇒ Pr
(λmax(Q)
Γtolσ˜2
≥
1
Tr(L˜)
)
≤ 1− κ1/J (33c)
⇐⇒ Φ−1NT(1− κ
1/J)Γtolσ˜
2 ≥ λmax
(
Q
) (33d)
⇐⇒ INT
(
Φ−1NT(1 − κ
1/J)Γtolσ˜
2
)
 Q (33e)
=⇒ Pr
(
Γtolσ˜
2 ≥ Tr
(
L˜Q
))
≥ κ1/J (33f)
⇐⇒ Pr
(
max
j∈{1,...,J}
{
ΓPE,j
}
≤ Γtol
)
≥κ, (33g)
where Q = W − ΓtolWE − ΓtolV. (d) and (e) are due to
the positive definiteness of matrix L˜ and a basic property of
probability, respectively. Φ−1NT(·) in (33d) denotes the inverse
cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) of an inverse central
chi-square random variable with 2NT degrees of freedom. We
note that the deviations in (33) do not require matrix W −
ΓtolWE−ΓtolV to be a positive semidefinite matrix. Besides,
the non-smoothness of λmax(·) is overcome by replacing (33d)
with its equivalent expression in (33e). Furthermore, random
variable L˜ is decoupled from the optimization variables, cf.
(31). Thus, the implication in (33d) is applicable to any
continuous channel distribution by replacing Φ−1NT(·) with an
inverse c.d.f. with respect to the corresponding distribution. In
practice, the inverse function of the inverse central chi-square
c.d.f. can be evaluated directly or be stored in a lookup table
in a practical implementation.
B. Proof of Theorem 1
The proof of Theorem 1 utilizes the results from [17,
Proposition 4.1]. In the first part, we show the struc-
ture of the optimal solution W∗. Then, in the second
part, we propose a method for constructing a solution
{W˜∗, V˜∗,W˜∗E, ρ˜
∗, δ˜
∗
, ν˜
∗} that achieves the same objective
value as {W∗,V∗,W∗E, ρ∗, δ
∗,ν∗} and admits a rank-one
W˜∗. It can be shown that the relaxed version of problem (25)
is jointly convex with respect to the optimization variables
and satisfies Slater’s constraint qualification. As a result, the
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions are necessary and suf-
ficient conditions [28] for the solution of the relaxed problem.
The Lagrangian function of (25) is given by
L =Tr(W)− Tr(WY)−
K−1∑
k=1
Tr
(
SC2k
(
W,V, δk
)
DC2k
)
−
K−1∑
k=1
Tr
(
SC5k
(
W,V,WE, νk
)
DC5k
)
+µ
( Pmin
η(1− ρ)
− Tr(HW)
)
+ β
(Γreqσ2s
ρ
−Tr(HW)
)
+
NT∑
n=1
θnTr
(
ΨnW
)
+Tr
(
WDC3
)
+∆, (34)
where ∆ denotes the collection of terms that only involve
variables that are not relevant for the proof. In (34), β ≥ 0
is the Lagrange multiplier for the minimum required SINR
of the desired receiver in C1. DC2k  0, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , K −
1},DC3  0, and DC5k  0, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , K − 1}, are
the Lagrange multiplier matrices corresponding to constraints
C2, C3, and C5, respectively. Lagrange multiplier µ ≥ 0
corresponds to the minimum required power transfer to the
desired receiver in C4. θ is the Lagrange multiplier vector
corresponding to constraint C6 on the per-antenna maximum
transmit power with elements θn ≥ 0, ∀n ∈ {1, . . . , NT}. Ma-
trix Y  0 is the Lagrange multiplier matrix for the positive
semi-definite constraint on matrix W in C8. Considering (34),
the KKT conditions for the optimal W∗ are given by:
Y∗,D∗C2k
,D∗
C3
,D∗C5k
0, µ∗, β∗, θ∗n ≥ 0, (35)
Y∗W∗=0, (36)
∇WL=0, (37)
∂L
∂ρ∗
= 0⇒ ρ∗=
√
β∗σ2sΓreq√
β∗σ2sΓreq +
√
µ∗Pmin
η
, (38)
where Y∗,D∗C2k ,D
∗
C3
,D∗C5k
, µ∗, β∗ and θ∗n, are the optimal
Lagrange multipliers for the dual problem of (25). It can
be observed from (38) that constraint C7: 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1 is
automatically satisfied. Besides, µ∗, β∗ > 0 must holds for
Γreq > 0 and Pmin > 0. On the other hand, (36) is the
complementary slackness condition and is satisfied when the
columns of W∗ lie in the null space of Y∗. Thus, the KKT
condition in (37) can be expressed as
INT +D
∗
C3
+
NT∑
n=1
θ∗nΨn +
K−1∑
k=1
Ugk
(D∗C2k
Γtolk
−D∗C5k
)
UHgk
= Y∗ + (µ∗ + β∗)H. (39)
For notational simplicity, we define
B∗ = INT +D
∗
C3
+
NT∑
n=1
θ∗nΨn
+
K−1∑
k=1
Ugk
(D∗C2k
Γtolk
−D∗C5k
)
UHgk . (40)
From the complementary slackness condition in (36), the
columns of W∗ have to lie in the null space of Y∗ for
W∗ 6= 0. Thus, we study the rank and null space of Y∗
for obtaining the structure of the optimal solution W∗. From
(39) and (40), we obtain for the Lagrange multiplier matrix
Y∗ = B∗ − (µ∗ + β∗)H, (41)
where (µ∗ + β∗)H is a rank-one matrix since µ∗, β∗ > 0.
Without loss of generality, we define r = Rank(B∗) and
the orthonormal basis of the null space of B∗ as Υ ∈
CNT×(NT−r) such that B∗Υ = 0 and Rank(Υ) = NT − r.
Let ̺t ∈ CNT×1, 1 ≤ t ≤ NT − r, denote the t-th column of
Υ. By exploiting [17, Proposition 4.1], it can be shown that
HΥ = 0 and we can express the optimal solution of W∗ as
W∗ =
NT−r∑
t=1
γt̺t̺
H
t + fuu
H , (42)
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Objective value: Tr(W˜∗) + Tr(V˜∗) + Tr(W˜∗E) = Tr(W∗) + Tr(V∗) + Tr(W∗E) (45)
C1: Tr(W˜
∗H)
σ2ant +Tr(HV˜
∗) +
σ2
s
ρ
=
Tr((W∗ −
∑NT−r
t=1 γt̺t̺
H
t )H)
σ2ant +Tr(H(V
∗ +
∑NT−r
t=1 γt̺t̺
H
t )) +
σ2
s
ρ
=
Tr(W∗H)
σ2ant +Tr(HV
∗) +
σ2
s
ρ
≥ Γreq, (46)
C2: SC2k(W˜
∗, V˜∗, δ˜k)  SC2k(W
∗,V∗, δk)+U
H
gk
[NT−r∑
t=1
γt̺t̺
H
t
]
Ugk(1+
1
Γtolk
)  0, ∀k, (47)
C3: λmax
(
W˜∗−ΓtolW˜
∗
E−ΓtolV˜
∗
)
≤ λmax
(
W∗−ΓtolW
∗
E−ΓtolV
∗
)
≤ Γtolσ˜
2Φ−1NT(1 − κ
1/J), (48)
C4: Tr(HW˜∗) + Tr(HW˜∗E) + Tr(HV˜∗) + σ2ant
= Tr(HW∗) + Tr(HW∗E) + Tr(HV
∗) + σ2ant ≥
Pmin
(1 − ρ∗)η
=
Pmin
(1− ρ˜∗)η
, (49)
C5: SC5k (W˜
∗, V˜∗,W˜∗E, ν˜
∗
k) = SC5k (W
∗,V∗,W∗E, ν
∗
k)  0, ∀k, (50)
C6: Tr
(
Ψn
(
W∗ +V∗ +W∗E
))
= Tr
(
Ψn
(
W˜∗ + V˜∗ + W˜∗E
))
≤ Pmaxn , ∀n, (51)
C7: 0 ≤ ρ˜∗ ≤ 1, C8: W˜∗  0, V˜∗  0,W˜∗E  0, C10: δ˜∗k, ν˜∗k ≥ 0, ∀k. (52)
where γt ≥ 0, ∀t, f > 0, f ∈ R, are positive scaling constants
and u ∈ CNT×1, ‖u‖ = 1, satisfies uHΥ = 0.
In the second part of the proof, for Rank(W∗) > 1, we
construct another solution of the relaxed version of problem
(25), {W˜∗, V˜∗,W˜∗E, ρ˜∗, δ˜
∗
, ν˜
∗}, based on (42). Let
W˜∗ = fuuH =W∗ −
NT−r∑
t=1
γt̺t̺
H
t , (43)
V˜∗ = V∗ +
NT−r∑
t=1
γt̺t̺
H
t ,
W˜∗E = W
∗
E, ρ˜
∗ = ρ∗, δ˜
∗
= δ∗, and ν˜∗ = ν∗. (44)
Then, we substitute {W˜∗, V˜∗,W˜∗E, ρ˜∗, δ˜
∗
, ν˜
∗} into the ob-
jective function and constraints in (25) which yields the
equations (45)–(52) on the top of this page, where (48) is
due to (33d) and (33e). It can be seen from (45) that the
solution set {W˜∗, V˜∗,W˜∗E, ρ˜∗, δ˜
∗
, ν˜
∗} achieves the same op-
timal value as the optimal solution {W∗,V∗,W∗E, ρ∗, δ
∗,ν∗}
and satisfies all the constraints, cf. (46)–(52). Thus,
{W˜∗, V˜∗,W˜∗E, ρ˜
∗, δ˜
∗
, ν˜
∗} is also an optimal solution but with
Rank(W˜∗) = 1, cf. (43). 
Remark 6: We note that {W˜∗, V˜∗,W˜∗E, ρ˜∗, δ˜
∗
, ν˜
∗} can be
obtained by substituting (43) and (44) into the relaxed version
of (25). Then, we solve the resulting convex optimization
problem for f and γt. On the other hand, the constructed
solution set with Rank(W˜∗) = 1 is not unique. In (43), we
construct V˜∗ by modifying the artificial noise structure of the
original solution, V∗, such that the constructed beamforming
matrix W˜∗ is rank-one. In fact, for achieving a rank-one
W˜∗, a general structure for constructing the artificial noise
and the energy signal can be expressed as V˜∗ = V∗ +∑NT−r
t=1 pitγt̺t̺
H
t and W˜∗E =W∗E+
∑NT−r
t=1 (1−pit)γt̺t̺
H
t ,
respectively, for any 0 ≤ pit ≤ 1, ∀t ∈ {1, . . . , NT − r}.
Yet, the non-uniqueness of the constructed solution does not
play an important role in this paper since all solutions achieve
the same optimal objective value while satisfying all the
constraints.
C. Proof of Proposition 1
We prove that Rank(W∗) = 1 when
D∗
C2k
Γtolk
−D∗C5k
 0, ∀k
holds. First, we post-multiply both sides of (41) by W∗ which
yields
B∗W∗ =
(
Y∗ + (µ∗ + β∗)H
)
W∗
(a)
= (µ∗ + β∗)HW∗, (53)
where (a) is due to the complementary slackness condition in
(36). Since D
∗
C2k
Γtolk
−D∗C5k
 0, ∀k holds by assumption, B∗
is a positive definite matrix. Then, by exploiting (53) and a
basic rank inequality, we have
Rank(W∗) = Rank(B∗W∗) = Rank((µ∗ + β∗)HW∗)
= min{Rank(W∗),Rank
(
(µ∗ + β∗)H
)
}.(54)
We note that Rank(H) = 1 and Rank
(
(µ∗+ β∗)H
)
is equal
to one since µ∗ + β∗ > 0. On the other hand, W∗ 6= 0
is required to satisfy the minimum SINR requirement of the
desired receiver in C1 when Γreq > 0. Therefore, Rank((µ∗+
β∗)H) = 1 and Rank(W∗) = 1 when
D∗
C2k
Γtolk
−D∗C5k
 0, ∀k
holds. 
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